Utz Roedig

On The Feasibility of a New Defense Layer for Wireless Sensor Networks using RF Ranging

Antony Chung and Utz Roedig. On The Feasibility of a New Defense Layer for Wireless Sensor Networks using RF Ranging. In Proceedings of the 1st IEEE International Conference on Network and Service Security (N2S2009), Paris, France, June 2009. (To Appear).

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Abstract

Cryptography is commonly used to provide linklayer message authentication in wireless sensor networks. However, keys are susceptible to compromise and introduce management requirements. Avoiding keys can therefore deliver security and management benefits. Our paper introduces and discusses the feasibility of RTTMAP, a protocol that uses radio frequency ranging for message authentication. RTTMAP uses secure round-trip-time with hash functions to determine the minimum distance of a transmitter. Transmissions from outside of a de¿ned radius are rejected without requiring keys. We provide our motivation, an evaluation of our ¿ndings and continuing research challenges. We find RTTMAP offers higher security, costs about twice the energy of keyed message authentication but complicates MAC protocol selection.

BibTeX

@InProceedings{         n2s09:chung,
  author        	= {Antony Chung and Utz Roedig},
  title         	= {{On The Feasibility of a New Defense Layer for Wireless Sensor Networks using RF Ranging}},
  year          	= {2009},
  month         	= jun,
  booktitle     	= {Proceedings of the 1st IEEE International Conference on Network and Service Security (N2S2009), Paris, France},
  note          	= {(To Appear).},
  abstract		= 
	{
			Cryptography is commonly used to provide linklayer message authentication in wireless sensor networks. 
			However, keys are susceptible to compromise and introduce management requirements. Avoiding keys can 
			therefore deliver security and management benefits. Our paper introduces and discusses the feasibility 
			of RTTMAP, a protocol that uses radio frequency ranging for message authentication. RTTMAP uses secure 
			round-trip-time with hash functions to determine the minimum distance of a transmitter. Transmissions 
			from outside of a de¿ned radius are rejected without requiring keys. We provide our motivation, 
			an evaluation of our ¿ndings and continuing research challenges. We find RTTMAP offers higher security, 
			costs about twice the energy of keyed message authentication but complicates MAC protocol selection. 
	}
}