Description
In June
1996, the new Ariane 5 rocket was launched on its maiden flight.
It carried a payload of scientific satellites. Ariane 5 was
commercially very significant for the European Space Agency
as it could carry a much heavier payload than the Ariane 4
series of launchers. Thirty seven seconds into the flight,
software in the inertial navigation system, whose software
was reused from Ariane 4, shut down causing incorrect signals
to be sent to the engines. These swivelled in such a way that
uncontrollable stresses were placed on the rocket and it started
to break up. Ground controllers initiated self-destruct and
the rocket and payload was destroyed.
Use in teaching
This
case study illustrates issues with requirements specification,
multi-organisational working, critical systems validation and
some of the problems of software reuse. The example illustrates
that good software engineering practice (reuse, don't introduce
changes unless necessary) can have problems. It also shows the
organisational complexity of systems development and how organisational
issues can lead to systems failure.I have used it in conjunction
with lectures on critical systems validation.
Related chapters
Chapter
7: Requirements engineering processes
Chapter 9: Critical systems specification
Chapter 24: Critical systems validation
Supporting
documents
Overview
of the Ariane 5 failure
My Powerpoint
presentation giving an overview of the causes of the system
software failure. Download PDF from here.
Enquiry
report
The failure of
the rocket led to a public enquiry. This is the text of
its published report.
Analysis
and discussion
An analysis and
discussion of the findings of the report.
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